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Defamatory words uttered by an advocate with reference to and in the course of
a judicial inquiry are not actionable, although irrelevant to the issues of fact in the
cause, and uttered without justification or excuse and from a motive of personal illwill.
In an action against counsel for defamatory words spoken, the questions of malice,
bona fides and relevancy cannot be raised ; the only question is, whether what is
complained of has been said in the course of the administration of the law.
Kendillon v. Maltby, Car. & M. 402, dissented from.

THIS was an action in the Queen's Bench Division, against an
advocate, for words spoken in defending a client. The facts were

as follows :
On the 9th and 17th of June 1881, at the Petty Sessions for
the borough of Brighton, Ellen Hill was charged with administering drugs in order to enable a felony to be committed. The
plaintiff in the present action was the prosecutor, and the defendant, Lamb, who was a solicitor, appeared for the defence of Ellen
Hill. The prosecutor's house was feloniously broken into and
entered at the end of February 1878, and several articles were
stolen. The prosecutor did not then reside at the house, but three
women, namely : Ellen Mockford and two sisters named Cartwright, were staying at the house, and a man named Hatch called
at the house in the evening preceding the burglary. The accused,
Ellen Hill, was at the prosecutor's house upon the evening in
question. Beer was drank by the three women and the man
Hatch. At the hearing of the charge before the petty sessions
they all were called, and in giving their evidence deposed, that
after drinking the beer they felt drowsy and sleepy. It was suggested on behalf of the prosecution that Ellen Hill had drawn the
beer and had put some narcotic drug into it, in order to throw the
inmates of the house into a deep sleep, and thereby to facilitate
the commission of the burglary. In the course of the proceedings
against Ellen Hill, the defendant, Lamb, acting as her advocate,
said: " I have my own opinion for what purpose all these young
women may have been resident in the house of Mr. Munster. I
can believe that there may have been drugs in the house of Mr.
Munster, and I have my own opinion for what purpose they were
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there, and for what they may have been used." It was alleged on
behalf of the plaintiff that the defendant, by using these words,
meant that the plaintiff had kept and used, and was accustomed to
keep and use, drugs for criminal and immoral purposes. The
charge against Ellen Hill was dismissed by the Court of Petty
Sessions.
The trial judge directed a nonsuit, which the court below sus-tained. Plaintiff appealed.
Waddy, Q. C., and Woollett, for plaintiff
-E.Clarke, Q. 0. (Gore with him), for defendant.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
M. R.-We need not call upon the counsel for the
defendant. The counsel for the plaintiff have given very great assistance to
the court, because not only have they gone through the cases
which can be said to support the proposition that they are called upon
to maintain, but also, as far as I can judge, they have cited all the
cases which have any bearing upon the matter. These cases have
been -fully discussed, and without calling upon the defendant's
counsel we are prepared now to give judgment.
This action is brought against a solicitor for words spoken by
him before a court of justice, whilst he was acting as advocate for
a person charged in that court with an offence against the law.
For the purposes of my judgment, I shall assume that the words
complained of were uttered by the solicitor maliciously, that is to
say, not with the object of doing something useful towards the
defence of his client; I shall assume that the words were uttered
without any justification or even excuse, and from the indirect
motive of personal ill-will or anger towards the prosecutor arising
out of some previously existing cause ; and I shall assume that the
words were irrelevant to every issue of fact which was contested in
the court where they were uttered; nevertheless, inasmuch as the
words were uttered with reference to, and in the course of, the
judicial inquiry which was going on, no action will lie against the
defendant, however improper his behavior may have been.
It has been contended that as a person defamed has, primafacie,
a cause of action, the person defaming must produce either some
statute or some previous decision directly in point which will
BRETT,
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justify his conduct. I cannot agree with that argument. The
common law does not consist of particular cases decided upon particular facts; it consists of a. number of principles which are
recognised as having existed during the whole time and course of
the common law. The judges cannot make new law by new
decisions; they do not assume a power of that kind; they only
endeavor to declare what the common law is and has been from
the time when it first existed. But, inasmuch as new circumstances, and new complications of fact, and even new facts, are
constantly arising, the judges are obliged to apply to them what
they consider to have been the common law during the whole
course of its existence, and therefore they seem to be laying down
a new law, whereas they are only applying old principles to a new
state of facts. Therefore, with regard to the present case, we have
to find out whether there is a principle of the common law, which
although it has existed from the beginning, is now to be applied
for the first time. I cannot find that there has been a decision of
a court of law with reference to such facts as are now before us,
that is, with regard to a person acting in the capacity of counsel,
but there have been decisions upon analogous facts ; and if we can
find out what principle was applied in these decisions upon the
analogous facts, we must consider how far it governs the case
before us.
Actions for libel and slander have always been subject to one
principle: defamatory statements, although they may be actionable
on ordinary occasions, nevertheless are not actionable libel and
slander when they are. made upon certain occasions. It is not
that 'these statements are libel or slander subject to a defence;
but the principle is that defamatory statements, if they are made
on a privileged occasion, from the very moment when they are
made are not libel or slander of which the law takes notice. Many
privileged occasions have been recognised. The occasion, with
which we now have to deal, is that a defamatory statement has
been made either in words or by writing in the course of an
inquiry regarding the administration of the law. It is beyond
dispute that statements made under these circumstances are privileged as to some persons, and it has been admitted by the plaintiff's counsel that one set of these persons are advocates: it could
not be denied that advocates are privileged in respect of at least
some defamatory statements made by them in the course of an
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inquiry as to the administration of the law. It was admitted that
so long as an advocate acts bona fide and says what is relevant,
owing to the privileged occasion, defamatory statements made by
him do not amount to libel or slander, although they would have
been actionable if they had not been made whilst he was discharging his duty as an advocate. But it was contended that an
advocate cannot claim the benefit of the privilege unless he
acts bona fide, that is, for the purpose of doing his duty as an
advocate, and unless what he says is relevant. That is the
question which we now have to determine.
Certain persons
can claim the benefit of the privilege which arises as to everything said or written in the course of an inquiry as to the
administration of the law, and without making an exhaustive enumeration, I may say that those persons are judges, advocates,
parties and witnesses. There have been decisions with regard to
three of these classes, namely, judges, parties and witnesses, and
it has been held that whatever they may have said in the course
of an inquiry as to the administration of the law, has been said
upon a privileged occasion, and that they are not liable to any
action for libel or slander. But it has been suggested that only
some of these classes of persons can successfully claim the privilege of the occasion, and those are, judges, parties and witnesses,
who make statements without malice and relevantly; and that
those judges, parties and witnesses who either speak or write without relevancy and with malice, cannot successfully claim the privilege of the occasion. I am inclined to think that with regard to
these classes of persons the law has not always been stated in the
same manner by the judges, and some judges have a strong objection to carry the privilege beyond the point to which they are
obliged by authority to carry it; they are disinclined to admit the
existence of the privilege. Other judges are inclined to carry
the privilege to its full extent, and we must see what is the doctrine which has been finally adopted. With regard to witnesses
the chief cases are, -Revis v. Smith, 18 C. B. 126; 25 L. J. (C.
P.) 195, and Henderson v. Broomhead, 4 H. & N. 569; 8 L. J.
(Ex.) 360; and with regard to witnesses, the general conclusion is
that all witnesses speaking with reference to the matter which is
before the court-whether what they say is relevant or irrelevantwhether what they say is malicious or not-are exempt from liability to any action in respect of what they state, whether the
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statement has been made in words, that is on viva voce examination,
or whether it has been made on affidavit. It was at one time
suggested that although witnesses could not be held liable to
actions upon the case for defamation, that is, fot actions for libel
and slander, nevertheless they might be held liable in another and
different form of action on the case, namely, an action analogous
to an action for malicious prosecution, in which it would be alleged
that the statement complained of was false to the knowledge of the
witness and was made maliciously and without reasonable or probable cause. This view has been supported by high authority; but
it seems to me wholly untenable. If an action for libel or slander
cannot be maintained, how can such an. action as I have mentioned
be maintained, that being in truth an action for defamation in an
altered form ? Every objection and every reason which can be
urged against an action for libel or slander will equally apply against
the suggested form of action. Therefore, to my mind, the best way
to deal with the suggested form of action is to dispose of it in the
words of CROMPTON, J., in Henderson v. Broomhead, 4 H. & N.
569, at p. 579, where he said: " The attempts to obtain redress for
defamation having failed, an effort was made in Bevis v. Smitl,
18 0. B. 126 ; 25 L. J. (C. P.) 195, to sustain an action analogous to an action for malicious prosecution. That seems to have
been done in despair." Nothing could be more strong, nothing
could show more clearly his entire disbelief in the possibility of
supporting that new form of action. The answer to the suggested
form of action was that during the hundreds of years which had
elapsed, such an action never had been sustained. No reported
case from the time of the commencement of the common law until
the present day can be found in which the suggested form of
action has been maintained, and yet it is impossible to suppose
that opportunities for bringing actions of that kind and of carrying them to a conclusion have not occurred again and again. However, the question is not as to the form of the action, but whether
an action of any kind will lie for defamation uttered in the course
of a judicial proceeding. CROMPTON, J., in Harrison v. Broomhead, 4 I. & N. 569, at p. 579, also said: "1No action will lie
for words spoken or written in the course of any judicial proceeding. In spite of all that can be said against it, we find the rule
acted upon from the earliest times. The mischief would be immense if the person aggrieved, instead of preferring an indict-
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meut for perjury, could turn his complaint into a civil action. :By
universal assent it .appears that in this country no such action lies.
CRESSWELL, J., pointed out in Bevis v. Smith, 18 C.B. 126, that
the inconvenience is much less than it would be if the rule were
otherwise. The origin of the rule was the great mischief that
would result, if witnesses in courts of justice were not at liberty to
speak freely, subject only to the animadversion of the court." It
is there laid down that the reason for the-rule with regard to witnesses is public policy. In Scott v. Stanfield, Law Rep., 3 Ex.
220, it was held that all judges, inferior as well as superior, are
privileged for words spoken in the course of a judicial proceeding,
although they are uttered falsely and maliciously and without
reasonable or probable cause. The ground of the decision was
that the privilege existed for the public benefit; of course it is
not for the public benefit that persons should be slandered without
having a remedy ; but upon striking a balance between convenience
and inconvenience, between benefit and mischief to the public, it
is thought better that a judge should not be subject to fear for the
consequences of anything which he may say, in the course of his
judicial duty. Therefore the cases of both witnesses and judges
fall within the rule as to privileged occasions, notwithstanding it
may be proved that any defamatory words spoken by them were
uttered from an indirect motive and to gratify their own malice.
In -Dawkins v. Lord Bbkeby, Law Rep., 8 Q. B. 255, it was
assumed for the purposes of the decision that the defendant had
been guilty of both falsehood and malice; nevertheless it was held
that no action would lie against him for statements made by him
as a witness. The ground of the decision was no doubt that a
witness in giving his evidence should not be afraid of being sued
for anything that he might say.- A similar view of the law was
taken in Seaman v. .Netherclift, 1 0. P. Div. 540; 2 Id. 53; and
the same rule has been applied to the parties. If upon the
grounds of public policy and free administration of the law the
privilege be extended to judges and witnesses, although they speak
maliciously and without reasonable or probable cause, is it not for
the benefit of the administration of the law that counsel also should
have an entirely free mind? Of the three classes, judge, Witness
and counsel, it seems to me that a counsel has a special need to have
his mind clear from all anxiety. A counsel's position is one of
the utmost difficulty. He is not to speak of that which he knows;
VoL. XXX
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he is not called upon to consider whether the facts with which
he is dealing are true or false. What he has to do, is to
argue as best he can, without degrading himself, in order to maintain the proposition which will carry with it either the protection
or the remedy which he desires for his client. If amidst the difficulties of his position he were to be called upon during the heat of his
argument to consider whether what he says is true or false, whether
what he says is relevant or irrelevant, he would have his mind so
embarrassed that he could not do the duty which he is called
upon to perform. For, more than a judge, infinitely more than a
witness, he wants protection on the ground of benefit to the public. The rule of law is, that what is said in the course of the
administration of the law, is privileged; and the reason of that
rule, covers a counsel even more than a judge or a witness. To
my mind it is illogical to argue that- the protection of privilege
ought not to exist for a counsel who deliberately and maliciously
slanders another person. The reason of the rule is, that a counsel
who is not malicious and who is acting bona fide, may not be in
danger of having actions brought against him. If the rule of law
were otherwise the most innocent of counsel might be unrighteously
harassed with suits, and therefore it is better to make the rule of
law so large that an innocent counsel shall never be troubled, although
by making it so large counsel are included who have been guilty
of malice and misconduct. In Bex v. Skinner, Lofft 55, Lord
MANSFIELD, a judge most skilful in enunciating the principles of

the law, treated a counsel as standing in the same position as a
judge or a witness. In Dawkins v. Lord Bokeby, Law Rep., 8 Q.
B. 255, at pp. 268, 264, 268, a most careful judgment was delivered on behalf of all the judges in the Exchequer Chamber, and
the opinion of Lord MANSFIELD 'as cited and adopted. If the
authority of these two cases is to be followed, counsel are equally
protected with judges and witnesses. I will refer to Kennedy
v. Hilliard,10 Ir. C. L. Rep. (N. S.) 195, and in that case PIGOTT,
C. B., delivered a most learned judgment. in the course of which
he said, (at p. 209): "I take this to be a rule of law, not
founded (as is the protection in other cases of privileged
statements), on the absence of malice in the party sued, but
founded on public policy, which requires that a judge, in dealing
with the matter before him-a party in preferring or resisting a
legal proceeding, and a witness in giving evidence, oral or written,
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in a court of justice, shall do so with his mind uninfluenced by
the fear of an action for defamation or a prosecution for libel."
Into the rule thus stated the word "counsel" must be introduced,
and the rule may be taken to be the rule of the common law.
That rule is founded upon public policy. With regard to counsel,
the questions of malice, bona fides, and relevancy, cannot be raised;
the only question is, whether what is complained of has been said
in the course of the administration of law. If that be so, the
case against a counsel must be stopped at once. No action of any
kind, on criminal prosecution, can be maintained against a defendant when it is established that the words complained of were
uttered by him as counsel in the course of a judicial inquiry; that
is, an inquiry before any court of justice into any matter concerning the administration of the law. I am of opinion that the rule
of law is such as I have pointed out, that it ought to be applied in
the present case, and therefore that this action cannot be maintained.
FRY, L. J., delivered a concurring opinion.
BRETT, M. R.-From our judgments it is obvious that we dissent from the opinion of Lora DENMAN, C. J., expressed by him
at Nisi Prius, in Kendillon v. Mfaltby, Car. & M. 402; 2 M. & R.
438.
Appeal dismissed.
The subject of PRIVILEGED COMIdUWICATXONS, being one which has received

but slight consideration in the United
States, although one of the most important doctrines of the law to every
citizen in the conduct of his private
affairs, and an absolutely vital one in
the performance of his public duties
under a free form of government such
as ours--where all public servants are
appointed by the people at large, either
directly or indirectly-the writer believes an attempt to state the principles
which govern this subject will not be
without value.
THE DOCTRINsE
LEGED

UPON WHICH 1PRIVr-

CO31MUNICATIONS

STANDS,

is

nothing less than that of public policy,
for, as is shown in the principal case,

there are certain circumstances under
which public good and convenience require
that individuals should speak fearlessly,
and that, therefore, a privilegeexists so to
speak, for the public good, and not solely
The Master of
to benefit defamers.
lolis, JEsSELL, forcibly states this as
the basis of the law in 17aller v. Lock,
45 L. T. R. 243, saying: "Society could
not go on without such inquiries. The
doctrine of privilege vnmt rest upon the
interests and necessities of society."'
Public policy, then, being the founiation of the doctrine, the privilege has
been liberally extended so far as the public welfare requires that it should be,
and there it finds its limits ; but to the
extent to which it exists, its protection
is absolute, for the law does not content
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itself with simply declaring that one
using defamatory language upon privileged occasions shall have a defence
which he may offer to an action; but
goes further, saying no defence is necesssry, as the defamatory statement never
was a libel or slander. This doctrine is
so well stated by BRETT, M. R., in the
principal case, that it is thought worth
while to repeat his language. " Actions," he says, "for libel and slander
have always been subject to one principle : defamatory statements, although
they maybe actionable on ordinary occasions, nevertheless are not actionable
libel and slander when they are made
upon certain occasions. It is not that
these statements are libel and slander subject to a defence ; but the principle is, that
defamatory statements, if they are made
on a privileged occasion, from the very
moment when thpy are made, are not libel
or slander of which the law takes notice."
PRIVILEGE-ABSoLTE

on QuALi-

rarely required, to individuals injured
by an occasional abuse of this privilege

and that, therefore, although in a single
case, there may have been intentional
falsehood, prompted by actual malice,
an action will not lie, as a recovery
would do incalculable injury by being
a constant menace and check to those
whose duties required of them fearless
speech on innumerable occasions where
there was no malice.
QUALIFIED

PRIVILEGE

exists

in

a much larger number of cases, and
while the decided cases will be used as
illustrations and authorities, it seems to
be of first importance to find the general
rule or principle upon which they all
rest. The distinction between these and
those absolutely privileged is simply,
that while in the latter class even intentional falsehood prompted by actual
malice, gives no cause of action, public
interests do not require so extended a
protection in the former, but are fully
guarded by establishing a privilege in
those cases only where there is no sufficient evidence of actual malice, as distinguished from what the law terms
implied malice. And the distinction be-

FIED.-From what has been said, it
will be seen that defamatory statements
are not only divided into those which are
actionable per se, and those which are
privileged ; but that a further distinction
exists in this latter class, governed, in tween privileged communications of a
extent, by the requisites of public policy. qualified nature and ordinary defamatory
statements, is that in the former class
This distinction causes the separation of
privileged communications into those there is no cause of action shown until
which are (1)absolutely privileged, and there has been some sufficient evidence of
those which are (2) qual fiedly privileged. actual malice, as distinguished from
.ABSOLUTzLY PRIVILEGED COMMU- malice implied; or shortly, that actual
xicAmIows are so well treated and malice is the very gist of the action ; while
illustrated in the leading case, that in the latter, the occasion being an ordifurther discussion is surely not neces- nary one, the law implies all the malice
sary, than to repeat that the doctrine necessary to sustain an action from the
has been applied to a very few cases statement itself, and that, therefore,
upon the ground that the public advan- while actual malice may be shown to intage in allowing persons, in the per- crease the damages, it is neither necesformance of certain duties where fear- sary for the plaintiff to prove the existlessness is an essential requisite of a ence of malice at all, nor is it open to
proper performance, to be entirely certain the defendant to rebut the presumption
that they will not be exposed to the an- of malice implied. (See Article 26,
noyance and uncertainty of a civil Albany L. J. 247.)
MAIC ET
, then, express or implied,
action, is more than compensation for
the injury done by refusing redress, so is an absolute requisite in all ac-
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tions for defamation (26 Alb. L. J.
247) ; and (except in the few cases
where an absolute privilcge exists),
where it exists of either character in
publishing defamation, an action will
always lie. It is, therefore, defining
qualified privilege, in a broad way, to
say that it exists where a defamatory
statement is made without malice of
either kind; and, as express or actual
malice means simply what the terms
state, the only requisite of a complete
definition is to find in what cases of
defamation the law does or does not
Fortunately, the auimply malice.
thorities show most clearly just where
the line rests; but before examining
them, it is proper to support the conclusions just stated by the concise and clear
statement of them recently made in
Thompson v. Dashwood, L. R., I IQ. B.
D. 45. WATEIN WLLimS, J., there
says: "The law stands thus: if a man
writes and publishes of another that
which is defamatory and untrue, the
law will imply malice on his part, and
the plaintiff need furnish no evidence
whatever of malice. But there are occasions on which the law regards the
defendants as so placed, and having
such an interest with respect to the subject-matter of the libel, that upon principles founded upon common sense, the
legal implication of malice is removed.
That is the doctrine of privilege."
Then, to advance, what are the occasions which rebut the implication of
malice ordinarily arising from the
publication of de'ramation ? To return
to the authorities : this inference of
malice is rebutted whenever it becomes
right in the interests of society that a
man should tell to a third person certain
facts, even though the duty to do so be
of but imperfect obligation, and this
duty may be either "legal, social or
moral:" Davis v. Snead, L. R., 5 Q.
B. 611, and Wallar v. Loch, 45 L. T.
R. 243, where JESSELL, M. R., says :
"If an answer is given in the discharge

of a social or moral duty, or if the person who gives itthinks it to be so, that
is enough, it need not even be an
answer to an inquiry, but the communication may be a voluntary one." In
Somerville v. HUawk-ins, 10 C. B. 538,
MAULE, J., says, defining a privileged
communication: "It comprehends all
classes of communications made bona
fide in the performance of a duty, or
with a fair and reasonable purpose of
protecting the interests of the party
words." In Toogood v. Spryusing tile
ing, I C., M. & R. 181, Baron PAnxa judge, who, in so many cases, has made
the first clear statement of the principles
upon which the law rests-says: if
"such publications" * * * "be fairly
made by a person in the discharge of
some public or private duty, whether
legal or moral, or in the conduct of his
own affairs in matters where his interest
is concerned, in such cases the occasion
prevents the inference of malice which
the law draws from unauthorized communications." * * * "If fairly warranted by any reasonable occasion or
exigency, and honestly made, such communications are protected for the common convenience and welfare of society ;
and the law has not restricted the right
to make them within any narrow limits."
In Bank v. Henty, L. R., 7 App. 741,
Lord BLAOCBURN says : "If the occasion is such that there was either a duty,
though, perhaps, only of imperfect obligation or a right to make the publication, it is said the occasion rebuts the
presumption of malice." Again, Lord
ELLENDOROUGH -a y, in Delany v.
Jones, I Esp. 193: "Though that
which is spoken or written may be injurious to the character of the party, yet,
if done bona fide, as with a view of
investigating a fact in which the party
making it is interested, it is not libellous." JEssELL, M. R., says, in IV4llar v. Loch, supra: " It appears to me.,
that if you ask a question of a person
whom you believe to have the means of
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knowledge about the character of another with whom you wish to have any
dealings whatever, and he answers bona
fide, this is a privileged communication." In Laughton v. The Bishop, 6c.,
L. R., 4 P. C. 504, the House of
Lords rules that 'a communication made
bona fide upon any subject-matter in
which the party communicating has an
interest, or in reference to which he has,
or believes he has, a duty, is privileged,
if made to a person having a corresponding interest or duty, although it
contains criminatory matter, which, without that privilege, would be defamatory
and actionable." And finally, SELDEN,
J., says, more generally, in Lewis v.
Herrick, 16 N. Y. 372: "Where the
circumstances show that the defendant
may reasonably be supposed to have had
a just and worthy motive for making the
charge, then the law ceases to infer
malice from the mere falsity of the
charge, and requires from the plaintiff
other proof of its existence." From
these cases it follows that the occasion
rebuts the ordinary inference of malice
in defamation; whenever there is a
duty, though but of imperfect obligation,
and whether legal, moral or social, to
speak, and whether it be in answer to
inquiries or voluntarily; whenever a
communication is made with a fair and
reasonable purpose of protecting the
interests of the party speaking; whenever a person speaks* in discharge'of a
duty, private or public, or in the conduct
of his own affairs in matters where his
interests are concerned ; whenever there
is a right to speak; whenever the person
is investigating a fact in which he is interested ; whenever the statement is made
in answer to the inquiry of a person
wishing to have any dealings whatever
with a third person; or whenever the
party communicating has an interest or
in reference to which he has, or believes
he has, a duty, if made to a person
having a like interest or duty, &c. So
that it may be seen that Baron PF.Arz

was well justified in saying that "The
law has not restricted the right to make
privileged communications within any
narrow limits."
CANDIDATES

FOR

PUBLIC

OPFICE,

from their peculiar position toward
citizens fall within a large number of the
principles just deduced from the authorities ; being but applicants for service to
one and all of the citizens of a free state.
Each citizen, therefore, if he have information affecting such candidate, is under
a duty to speak to protect the interests
of his country and fellow citizens; it is
also to protect his own interests ; it is in
the conduct of his own affairs in matters
where his interest is concerned; he has
the right to speak ; it is in the investigation of a fact in which he has a most
vital interest-the fitness of the man for
the place; it is a communication by a
party having an interest in the matter to others having a like interest.
Were there no such privilege, while,
under established principles, it would be
possible to prevent unfaithful employees
from plundering one private master after
another; they would all have the public
service to fall back upon, as, in seeking
employment there, citizens would not
dare speak, and the public would be at
the mercy of corrupt men of every class.
There is no hardship in making seekers
for public service the subject of the freest
scrutiny and investigation, as to ask for
public advancement is purely voluntary,
and, therefore, not enforced upon any one
whose character and sensibilities are such
as to make him unwilling to submit to
the inquiry, absolutely necessary if the
efficiency and purity of the public service
are to be maintained. For these reasons,
the courts have properly extended the doctrine of privilege to such cases with great
liberality, remembering that the privilege
is given that citizens should not fear to
speak and investigate freely, and that the
doctrine of privilege would be a mere delusion, were a citizen to be subjected to
the. risk of losing both property and

31UNSTER v. LAMB.
liberty, should chance send him before a
peculiar, an ignorant, or a prejudiced
jury. The authorities, are numerous to
this effect, but before examining them, it
is important to state again, that in this,
as in all other cases-it is the occasion
that gives the privilege, and not the position
merely of the party slandered, as has
occasionally been erroneously argued;
resulting in one case, (Lewis v. Few, 5
Johns. 1, followed by Moulton v. Eno, 81
N. Y. 125), in the court entirely overlooking the substantial, reasonable and
thoroughly established grounds on which
privilege stands, as well as its necessity
and immense value to the public, and
holding that a criticism of a public man,
is only open to the one defence of "justification," which would throw a citizen,
no matter how strong his reason for
speaking, should he do so, on the mercy
of that uncertain quantity, a jury, and
so terrorize the whole community into
silence, until, perhaps, affairs became so
desperate, as to cause them to rise in revolution, as they have before under gross
tyranny. The true rule is apprehended
to be, that, of course, a man has no right
whatever to defame another, simply because he has employed him; but it is
quite otherwise where a third person intending to employ the servant, seeks his
character of a former employer. There
the occasion is a proper one for speaking,
and so of public men. There is no legal
protection to a man for defamation
against another, simply because he happens to be entrusted with a public position, but there certainly is, as the
authorities abundantly show, where the
occasion makes a I,canvass"I regarding
his fitness for the place necessary or
proper; as for example, where a person
criticized, announces himself as a candidate, and citizens are engaged in an
cffort to act intelligently, in either accepting or refusing him. Justice STORY
in his great work on the constitution, see.
1888, says : "This is the great security
of a free government."
The cases
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almost without exception, hold that
"where a person becomes a candidate
for office conferred by popular election,
he must be considered as putting his
character in issue, so far as his qualifications for office are concerned ": Commonwealth v. Odell, 3 Pittsb. 449 ; Mayrant
v. Richardson, I Nott & McC. 347;
Harlev.Catherall, 14 L. T. (N. S.) 801;
Brockerman v. Keyser, 5 Clark 152;
and in such cases, many of the decisions (especially in New York, a state
which has fluctuated from one extreme
to the other in granting or refusing privilege), have gone-the length of holding,
that an appeal to the appointing power
by a citizen is privileged, even though
made maliciously, provided, there be
probable cause for the charge : McIntyre
v. McBean, 13 U. C. Q. B. 540;
Onnsby v. Douglass, 37 N. Y. 479 ;
Howard v. Thompson, 21 Wend. 319 ;
Stredy v. Wood, 15 Barb. 105 ; Van
Wyck v. Aspinwall, 17 N. Y. 193;
27horn v. .Blanchard, 5 Johns. 508; Cook
v. Hill, 3 Sandf. 350; Chapman
v. Calder, 2 Harris 368, and these
cases seem to be founded upon sound
sense, as well as the analogies of the
law. But no American authority could
more strongly show the necessity for the
existence of such a privilege, than the
fact that it has been found absolutely necessary to grant it even in Englaud, a
monarchy much more conservative, and
less free than our republic, and yet the
law has nowhere been more clearly
stated or vigorously enforced than there.
A quotation from but a single case will
be sufficient. The court say, in Henwood v. Harrison, L. R., 7 C. P. 606:
"Every man has a right to discuss freely
so long as he does it honestly, and without malice, any subject in which the public
are generally interested ; to state his own
views, and advance those of others, for
the consideration of all or any of those
who have a common interest in the subject; and while he does so, he has
a privilege attaching to such a right of
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free discussion, of the same character
noted that there are many occasions in
which has been held to attach in numer- which a communication is privileged,
ous instances, in which the liberty of although the party making it has no bespeech has been allowed upon grounds of lief whatever as to its truth or untruth.
social convenience, wlere the writer and Baron BRAxwELL, in Clarkv. Molyaeux,
the person addressed, have a duty or in- 3 Q. B. Div. 237, thus calls attention to
terest in common, the existence of which this principle: "A person may honestly
is held to rebut the inference of malice."
make on a particular occasion a defamaTHE BURDEN
OF PROVING Ac- tory statement without believing it to be
TUAL MALICE, which it is necessary to
true: because the statement may be of
do to support the action, is of course such a character that on the occasion it
upon the plaintiff. And its existence may be proper to communicate it to a
must be fully made out, the presumption particular person, who ought to be inbeing that it does not exist. Therefore, formed of it." A good illustration of
as in an action for malicious prosecution this is found in Robshaw v. Smith, 38 L.
(see Abrath v. Railroad C., L. R., ii
T. R.'(N. S.) 423, where the manager
Q. B. Div. 448), it is not enough for the of a bank, being applied to for informaplaintiff to show that he is innocent of tion respecting the plaintiff who dealt
the charge. M.AuLE, J., says, in Somer- with the bank, by an applicant who was
ville v. Hawkins, supra: "Supposing
interested in the transactions between
the defendant himself to believe the them, handed the applicant a defamatory
charge-a supposition always to be made and libellous letter which he had rewhere the question is whether the occasion ceived; and, although it was anonymous
be privileged or not-it was the duty, &c." and had been received a year before, the
And in Spill v. Maule, L. R., 4 Ex. court nonsuited. It has been said that
232, COCKBURN, C., J.,
says: "We
where the defendant himself is the writer
have not to deal with the question of a libel, it may-be regarded as a picwhether the plaintiff did or did not act ture of his mind at the time ; and so the
dishonestly and disgracefully" * * * requisite evidence of malice may be ob"if the defendant stated no more than tained should the language of the paper
what he believed, or what he might be such as was not warranted, even
reasonably believe, he is not liable, and though the defendant believed, as it is to
unless proof of the contrary is produced he presumed lie did, the facts that caused
we must take it that he did state no him to speak. But there has not been a
more." See also Clark v. Molyneux, 3 case found where the language was held
Q. B. Div. 237, and Lewis v. Herrick, to he so violent as to justify the submis16 N. Y. 372, in which SnLBsaN, J.,
sion of an otherwise privileged commusays: "The term 'privileged,' as ap- nication, to a jury, although, as will be
plied to a communication alleged to be seen, in some of them the language was
libellous, means simply that the circum- very violent. And the courts certainly
stances under which it was made are will not do so on this ground, unless in a
such as to repel the legal inference of very plain case. It is said in Somerville
malice, and to throw upon the plaintiff the v. Hawkins, supra: "It is true the facts
burden of offering some evidence of its proved are consistent with malice, as well
existence beyond the mere falsity of the as with its absence. But that is not
charge." If this were not so there would sufficient to entitle the plaintiff to have
be no meaning in the term "privileged,"
the question of malice left to the jury;
and there would be nothing left in such for the existence of malice is consistent
eases as a defence but what is technically with the evidence in all cases except
called "justification."
It is also to be those in which something inconsistent
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with malice is shown in evidence; so
that to say that.in all cases where the
evidence was consistefit with malice, it
ought to be left with the jury, would be
in effect to say that the jury might find
malice in any case in which it was not
disproved-which would be inconsistent
with the admitted rule that in cases of
privileged communications malice must
be proved, and, therefore, its absence
must be presumed until such proof is
given." And in the case of Laughton v.
Bishop, 4-c., supra, the court says:
"Some expressions here used undoubtedly go beyond what was necessary for
self-defence, but it does not therefore
follow that they afford evidence of malice
for a jury. To submit the language of
privileged communications to a strict
scrutiny, and to hold all excess beyond
the absolute exigency of the occasion to
be evidence of malice, would, in effect,
greatly limit if not altogether defeat
that protection which the law throws
over privileged communications." And
see cases there cited as well as the
strong opinion of the Chief Justice
in McIntyre v. M1cBean, supra, and
Brow v. Hathaway, 13 Allen 241 ;
Remington v. Congdon, 2 Pick. 311. It
has also been held not to take away the
privilege, that third parties were present
when the charge was made. Toogood v.
Spyring, supra; Brown v. Hathaway,
supra, &c. The duty of the court, where
there is no sufficient evidence of express
malice, is plainly to direct a verdict or
nonsuit, and not subject the defendant to
the chances of an adverse verdict for doing only that which it was his duty or
right to do, and which public policy requires that he should do. Taylor v.
Hawkins, 16 Ad. & El. (N. S.) 308;
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Somerville v. Hawkins, supra, &c. As
is forcibly said by WVILLES, J., in Hienwood v. Harrison, L. R., 7 C. P. 626:
" It would be abolishing the law ot
privileged discussion, and deserting the
duty of the court, to decide upon this
as upon any other question of law, if
we were to hand over the question of
privilege or no privilege to a jury. A
jury, according to their individual views
of religion or policy, might hold the
church, the army, the navy, or parliament itself, to be of no national importance, or the liberty of the press to be of
less consequence than the feelings ofsome
thin-skinned disputant." It is to be
remembered, however, that where the
defamation is an accusation by the defendant and not merely a statement that
a charge had been made by another person, there can be no stronger proof of
actual malice, than that it was known to
be false when made, so that proof of the
absence of probable cause, is evidence
of express malice and was so ruled by
GiusoN, C. J., in Gray v. Penfland, 4
S. & R. 420.
It seems necessary to say further only
that where the occasion is privileged, and
express malice is, therefore, requisite to
sustain an action, that nothing can take its
place. It is not sufficient that the defondant made the publication negligently.
Thompson v. Dashwood, L. R., II Q. B.
Div. 43. (A very interesting case just
decided.) Nor even that it was made
rashly and without sufficient inquiry.
Clark v. Roe, 4 Ir. C. L. 1,as express
or actual malice, and that only will
sustain an action for defamation, where
•the occasion is privileged.
GEoRG E . EARLE, JR.
Philadelphia.

